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1. FOREWORD 
 
GIOLO FELE AND VINCENZO D’ANDREA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In February 2005 a composite group of scholars from different 
disciplines met in a nice Casa Rustica close to the Antica Vetreria 
on the Sarca river, at the entrance of Val di Genova, a small valley 
in the Italian Alps. It was the first of a series of events called 
Alpis: Alpine Ski Seminar on Information Systems. Since 2005, 
the purpose of that gathering of people has been to promote the 
social study of Information Systems in the Mediterranean region 
and the emergence of a European/Mediterranean identity for the 
scientific community on Information Systems. The Alpis ski 
seminar has been an “institute des hautes Ètudes” with a 
ludic/sport component, where high quality contributions from 
young  researchers in the field have been presented in four 
subsequent days of discussion with peers, in an environment 
enriched by contributions of established senior researchers. 
Both the format, promoting interaction and sociality, and the 
scientific dimension, promoting interdisciplinarity while maintaing 
a specific focus, have been the distinct trait of the Seminar series.  
According to the invitation of Claudio Ciborra and Gianni 
Jacucci - the Scientific Coordinators of the Alpis Ski Seminars first 
edition - the research on Information Systems being presented 
and discussed in the Alpis community has been characterized by 
the reference to philosophical inquiry and to phenomenology in 
particular. 
This publication is based on the inspirational talk the 
philosopher Ken Liberman gave to the Alpis Sky seminar 5th 
edition in 2009. Liberman teaches sociology at the University of 
Oregon and has been Fulbright Senior Specialist at the Faculty of 
Sociology, University of Trento in 2009. Liberman centers his talk 
around the topic of situated knowledge, a growing concern in the 
field of information systems. Liberman adopts a phenome-
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nological perspective, with a strong ethnomethodological 
orientation. A student of Peter Berger and Herbert Marcuse, but 
especially of Harold Garfinkel [2002] and Hubert Dreyfus [1990], 
Liberman discusses and presents his argument starting from an 
examination of Section 29 of the fundamental text of Heidegger’s 
Being and Time. Essentially, this very complex text deals with the 
question of the adequacy of our modes of representation of social 
forms and with the ways in which these forms are experienced in 
our daily lives. It is well known that technological solutions create 
patterns and structures of social organization which impose life 
forms completely outside of our experience with which we must 
come to terms, often with difficulty. As we know much of the 
engineering culture which is at the base of these technological 
solutions is not oriented towards a social or sociological 
perspective. Recently, however, we have seen a growing interest in 
the social contexts of technological innovations [for a 
reconstruction see Fele 2009]. This shift of attention by the 
specialists in business sciences, management, and information 
systems, has led to a deepening of social approaches into the 
constitutive mechanisms and the fundamental forms of social life 
[cfr. Dourish 2001; De Michelis 2008]. Here we see the important 
role, on the theoretical level, of phenomenology and 
ethnomethodology, and on the methodological level, of 
ethnography, in identifying, recognizing and describing the most 
profound and most subtle aspects of our social life [see Fele 
2008]. Heidegger's philosophy provides the ideas for a non-trivial 
reflection on the foundations of situated understanding [Dreyfus 
1995; Winograd 1995; Ciborra 2004]. 
The issue of situated knowledge covered by Liberman’s essay 
goes far beyond the usual (although by no means obvious) 
importance attributed to context in the processes of 
communication. See the following passage from Winograd & 
Flores [1985]: "The computer, like any other medium, must be 
understood in the context of communication and the larger 
network of equipment and practice in which it is situated. A 
person who sits down at a word processor is not just creating a 
document, but is writing a letter or a memo or a book. There is a 
complex social network in which these activities make sense. It 
includes institutions (such as post offices and publishing 
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companies), equipment (including word processors and computer 
networks, but also all of the older technologies with which they 
may coexist), practices (such as buying books and reading the 
daily mail), and conventions (such as the legal status of written 
documents)"(pp. 5-6). Winograd and Flores seminal perspective 
recognizes the role and value of the network of relations within 
which social action acquires meaning. Liberman’s contribution 
invites us to look further and deeper. From an 
ethnomethodological perspective [Garfinkel 2002], Liberman 
invites us to explore the depths of our ordinary social world, the 
primitive place of our experience. As an anthropologist who spent 
two years with some Australian Aboriginal tribes [Liberman 1985] 
and three years in a Tibetan monastery [Liberman 2004], he 
encourages us to reflect on that world taken for granted that we 
call reality. Similarly, as philosopher [Liberman 2007], he sees the 
limits of reason and the difficulties we fall into when we 
overconceptualize our worldly relations, when we entrust entirely 
to what he calls "the formal analysis", when we don’t recognize 
the very carnal, practical and experiential character of social life. 
Starting from this basis, the paper offers grounds for reflection on 
the field of information systems. In the second part of this 
publication, Gianluigi Viscusi, Ylenia Curzi and Gian Marco 
Campagnolo discuss the role of formal representations in 
information systems, action-research framework and fieldwork, 
and the possibility of research which addresses post-local 
concerns. 
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2. HEIDEGGER’S NOTION OF BEFINDLICHKEIT 
AND THE MEANING OF “SITUATED” IN 
SOCIAL INQUIRIES 
 
KENNETH LIBERMAN 
 
 
 
 
Four months ago Gian Marco Campagnolo sent me an email 
inviting me to speak about phenomenology to the group here, and 
I emailed to Gian Marco, “Yes, I know a good deal about 
phenomenology, but I know nothing about Information Systems: 
how can I learn what would be relevant to say to them? I said I 
was interested because I had a long friendship with the chair of 
our Computer Science Department and also I had three colleagues 
that are ethnomethologists - Lucy Suchman, Jack Whalen and 
Marilyn Whalen – and who have done interesting research for 
Xerox about how people actually use Xerox machines. I am aware 
of their work and I am also aware that I should know more.”  
I have, however, been spending most of the last twelve years 
studying the practices of reasoning of Tibetan monks, including 
spending three years in a Buddist monasteries, so I am not very up 
to date on what information systems research has been 
accomplishing, so I asked Gian Marco again, “How can my 
participation be useful?” and he replied that there is a group very 
interested in phenomenology. He sent me an article by Claudio 
Ciborra to introduce me to the interest of ALPIS in 
phenomenology, and so I said yes. It was then that he informed 
me that I was to speak the first night. I rejected that idea, saying 
that if someone does not know what the people are thinking, you 
want him to speak late in the program. I added that I was certain 
there would be something of relevance I could say after listening 
to all of the papers, but it was an unreasonable expectation for the 
first night.  
Then I began reading Ciborra’s article, “Getting to the Heart 
of the Situation: the Phenomenological Roots of Situatedness,” 
and I ran across this passage from pages 5-6: 
 12
 
“References to phenomenology are often made, but never quite fully 
explored and exploited. Collateral aspects are mentioned, such as 
transparency, ready-to-handedness and so on. Yet nobody quotes 
Section 29 of Being and Time, where Heidegger [1962, pp. 172-182] 
introduces the notion of situatedness (Befindlichkeit), contrasting it with 
the privileged role attributed then (and now) to understanding, cognition 
and the purely mental. … Lack of proper references to phenomenology 
while using its ascendance may also induce the reader not versed in 
philosophy to believe that what these authors say about situatedness is 
indeed all that phenomenology has had to say on the subject.” 
 
So I considered, if they want to know more about 
phenomenology and one of their founding thinkers has 
recommended reading Section 29 of Heidegger’s Being and Time, 
then instead of offering more talk about phenomenology, our 
meeting could be an occasion for reading some phenomenology. 
And I could think of no better selection from Heidegger than the 
Section 29 cited by Ciborra.  
Ciborra’s paper “Getting to the Heart of the Situation,” could 
be re-titled, “How did Befindlichkeit come to be ‘Situated’, and what 
has it lost along the way?” Ciborra complains about what the 
Americans, like Suchman, do with Heidegger when they undertake 
“situated studies”. I have some sympathy with Ciborra’s lament 
here. As a social phenomenologist I can say that I have spent 
much of the past four decades wincing whenever I heard or read 
sociologists, anthropologists, linguists, etc. use the term 
“phenomenological”. During this time, the thin, shallow use of 
the term “phenomenology” is probably the principal reason I 
have rejected the manuscripts that I review for various journals 
and publishers. 
So, let us examine Heidegger section on “Being as 
Attunement”. My discussion is divided into four parts: (2.1) What 
is the big deal about in situ studies?; (2.2) The Problem with Over-
conceptualizing, and the Limits of Conoscenza Teoretica; (2.3). 
Befindlichkeit; (2.4)The Limits of Formal Analysis. 
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2.1. What is the big deal about in situ studies? 
How can something so subjective have had so much 
influence? For the significant reason that the way that most of our 
models represent the world is deeply flawed. This includes not 
only our models as analysts but also the lay models that ordinary 
people and professionals alike employ in their everyday life. 
Our lives are lived subjectively. And our models do not 
account for the way we actually live our lives. They idealize 
matters, and the real work is made invisible; worse, the real work 
is obscured by the aggressive employment of our most cogent 
models. Worse still, the more cogent the models are made, the 
more obscuring they do. The actual social medium of our ordinary 
work of organizing local situations is rarely visible to the analyst, 
or to the practitioners, in just the way that water is unnoticed by the 
fish who swim in a stream. One of the reasons is that the 
influence of the Enlightenment survives today in the form of a 
compulsion to make things out to be more definite and certain 
than they really are. And here even the realists are lost within an 
idealism.  
There is no fact, no “objective” that is not accompanied by an 
interpretation; therefore, there can only exist a subjective 
objective. There is objectivity, but it is always an interpreted 
objectivity. I ask my students sometimes: “What is the difference 
between a fact and an interpretation?” They have all these pop 
theories that they offer me, but by the end I manage to convince 
them that most facts are interpretations. We have a great need for 
objectivity, not only for pursuing reliable knowledge but also for 
making it possible to communicate with each other; but the 
objectivity we need is always and necessarily a subjective 
objectivity. You cannot find an objective objectivity. If you 
pretend that you have one and deny the subjective aspects of 
objectivity, then by denying the way the world really is you are in 
fact being less “objective” and more prejudiced than those who 
recognize the subjective role of understanding things. This is in 
fact “the Crisis” that Husserl writes about in his last great work, 
The Crisis of the European Sciences, and Transcendental Phenomenology. 
The “transcendental” here is a reference to the co-presence of 
subjectivity and objectivity. 
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More importantly, our lives are much more complicated than 
the purveyors of planful thought and rational choice theory would 
have it. The complexities of any ordinary life in situ renders most 
of the modeling of cognitive scientists foolish. There is time here 
just to mention one reason why, and that is the reflexivity of 
understanding: understanding is rarely the deductive process that 
Isaac Newton would want to talk about. Reflexivity refers to 
practices that at the same time describe and constitute a social 
framework because we have the ability to find whatever we 
describe – or rather, our practices of understanding constitute the 
framework while they describe it. That is, the describing is the 
constituting – the practice of employing an interpretation in our 
practical lives is what constitutes the framework, as it describes 
that same situation. Basically, our practices of understanding are 
finding themselves. The understanding is always describing itself. 
And I wish to direct you not only to researchers like ourselves. 
Although is certainly true for us, I am speaking of people in their 
ordinary lives.  
In the case of the research of Lucy Suchman, I am talking 
about the people who use Xerox machines and try to understand 
the latest version of instructions on the LCD screen that the 
machine displays. People have no choice but to employ whatever 
understanding they have of xeroxing by fiddling around with the 
displays on the touch-screen and pushing buttons or whatever 
they think it is going on. No matter what, they are going to read 
into the situation what they think they know, and find a way to get 
the work done. And in most cases the work will get done, but 
there will be a great deal of serendipity to it. Most interestingly, 
the way they get the work done on the Xerox machine may never 
have been anticipated by the people who designed the machine or 
those who designed the instructions. The former Secretary of 
Defense of United States might have included what Xerox’s 
designers didn’t know among the “unknown unknowns.” 
Reflexivity is that feature of comprehending some structure of 
social action that presupposes, while it provides and provokes, the 
conditions that make its own intelligibility sensible. 
Phenomenology is very much taken up with the practical tasks of 
finding and maintaining the intelligibility of local situations in the 
course of being in them, i.e. the in situ. 
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Most planful accounts miss the reflexivity of quotidian life, 
which is the moment-by-moment adjustment and feedback 
between situation and reflection, something so spontaneous that it 
cannot be predicted in advance. Accordingly, oftentimes planful 
accounts are unable to locate the real problems that people have 
to face, and so we get instruction manuals that no one is able to 
understand. 
All this was something of an embarrassment to the 
organizational theory used by information systems researchers. So 
talk of “situated” studies began, in many instances led by 
ethnomethodological research projects that located the “troubles” 
that were to be found in local occasions, projects that exposed to 
analysts the work of the reflexivity of understanding. 
Because of reflexivity and other phenomena like it (such as the 
indexicality of meanings) textbook versions rarely reflect reality.  
Let me give you three illustrations of what I am talking about.  
1. The Oregon state highway department has a planning 
division that handles all the sign painting, traffic routing, painting 
of lanes, the setting up of signal systems for traffic flows of 
automobiles, et cetera, in the State of Oregon (USA). Around 
1986, they came to the conclusion that all good ideas should be 
“put on the back-burner,” which is American slang for “No 
matter how brilliant your theory sounds: don’t implement it until 
you actually do a pilot study.” The pilot studies are instituted for a 
short period of time (three-nine months is typical) in a test 
location before initiating more widespread application that could 
create messes all over the state that would then have to be cleaned 
up. The Oregon state highway department has learned, as part of 
their practical work, never to administer a new policy of lane-
painting, sign-posting, signal systems, traffic-routing, etc. without 
first implementing it on a trial-only basis. This is for the very good 
reason that they have had long experience with the unanticipated 
consequences of their previous brilliant planning that created 
disasters that they were forced to undo. There are so many of these 
unanticipated consequences that they concluded that these 
consequences are not anticipatable.  
2. The people who write computer programs have similarly 
learned not only that they cannot predict where the bugs in the 
program will occur, they also cannot predict what clever things 
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they have devised, until the people who use the beta versions 
report back to them. The beta versions offer opportunities to tell 
the designers what they have designed. These reports on beta 
versions even teach them how they should market the programs 
and which people and groups to market it to. They find some 
bugs but they also learn what it was they really achieved. There is 
now a universal reliance on beta versions, and I interpret that as a 
frank admission that you can not plan for everything. 
3. The man who worked for the 3-M company who invented 
post-its was reading a technical book on an airplane and kept 
losing the place in the book where the footnotes were. So when 
he returned to the lab, he invented post-its. He didn’t have the 
slightest idea he would change how every office in the world 
worked, and would also change the face of every refrigerator on 
earth; but he is happy to accept the credit for his wonder just the 
same.  
These illustrations give you the idea that “situated” studies are 
oriented to discovering what the plans did not plan for. And they 
can only be discovered by going out into the world and looking. 
That is, you cannot recover it by restricting yourself to a review of 
your best theorizing. This is what the big deal about “situated” 
studies is about: situated studies are oriented to discovering what 
the plans didn’t plan for. 
2.2. The Problem with Over-conceptualizing, and the Limits of Conoscenza 
Teoretica 
What Heidegger calls “Attunement” (Il Trovarsi) is one of the 
fundamental three existential facts of life of what he calls being-
in-the-world – the other two fundamental existential facts of 
being-in-the-world are “Understanding” and “Discourse.” 
Attunement is the name for what is being more than knowing: 
attunement does not know why (127a) it is … “Non si sa. Sono 
cose che l’esserci non può sapere” (It 389b/ G 134b). The idea is 
that we already are in a situation doing something before we know 
about it, and the problem with cognitive scientists as well as with 
rational choice theorists in sociology and political science is that 
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they have a model for how human beings act that examines 
phenomena that occur only from the chin up. For them people do 
have bodies, which is the point of Ciborra’s “Heart” in the title of 
his work.  
I have spent five years in India, and I have read a good deal of 
classical Indian scholarship, not only Tibetan scholarship in 
Tibetan but also a lot of Vedanta epistemology. India has a long 
tradition of scholarship going back before the time of Christ. 
They are very rigorous, almost too technical, but they are oriented 
to trying to find out about being, and they try to keep their knowing 
about being from preventing their winning reflective access to 
being. They have been dealing directly with the very problem I am 
addressing, and it is quite interesting to consider their work in this 
area. I think this is part of the reason why that many philosophers 
of the West do not consider what Indians do to be “philosophy.” 
For most European scholars, and for many of my colleagues, 
philosophy properly resides above the chin. When I once 
confronted a brilliant Sanskrit-speaking Vedanta scholar in India 
over a luncheon table, asking him whether he felt offended that 
Western scholars do not consider what he does to be 
philosophical, he told me, “They are right. It is not philosophy. 
We are not interested in philosophy: it is too mechanical and 
heartless a pursuit.” 
Derrida is following Heidegger’s lead when he keeps seeking 
ways to infect his inquiries with what he calls “non-knowledge.” 
And we social scientists need to do the same, since there is so 
much going on in social organization that is not conceptual. We 
need to put more effort into studying non-knowledge, which 
accounts for a majority of what people do. 
According to Heidegger, in Section 29, “Discourse does not, 
as such, mean to be known” (127b/ G 134c). And, “The 
possibilities of disclosure to cognition fall far short …” (1217a). He 
is not saying that there is not discourse or cognition, but there is 
so much else going on that we need to pay close attention to it as 
well. 
At the same time these passages occur in Section 29, 
Heidegger sternly warns us against becoming ‘touchy-feely.’ 
Having taken a stand against common sense as well as against 
formal theoretical cognition, Heidegger still insists on rigorous 
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attention to the just-what of the actual experience in situ. This is 
what is meant by phenomenology. Heidegger writes (130b), “We 
must not confuse demonstrating the existential-ontological 
constitution of cognitive determination in the attunement of 
being-in-the-world with the attempt to surrender science to feeling.” 
“Non si vorrà scambiare la dimostrazione esistenzial-
ontologica che il determinare conoscitivo si costituisce nel trovarsi 
nell’essere nel mondo, col tentativo di consegnare onticamente la 
scienza nelle mani del sentimento”. 
This rigor, our rigor, consists of paying attention only to 
“evidence” (German: Evidenz, Italian Evidenza), which is one of 
the basic notions of Husserl’s program of rigorous inquiry. 
Formal analytic accounts miss this Evidenz due to the myopia 
created by their continuous preoccupation with their theorizing. 
Evidence grounds understanding: it is what comes first.  
Heidegger also tells us, “Disclosedness does not mean ‘to be 
known’”. We cannot reduce our experience to conceptual 
knowing. One must already have found oneself in a situation 
when one commences to know. We need to study the how of this 
finding ourselves as well as studying the knowing, and our problem is 
that we are studying only the knowing. Heidegger tells us that we 
are not to minimize the Evidenz of attunement “by measuring it 
against the apodictic certainty of the theoretical cognition” (128b). 
I do not have time, but I could give you the wonderful discussion 
that Emmanuel Levinas has provided us about the itinerary of 
ethics and morality in Western philosophy and how they have lost 
their connection to evidence and have been turned by 
philosophers into a strictly logical and formal analytic enterprise. 
So I will just mention it, rather than giving you the details on this 
occasion. 
Merleau-Ponty, who is probably the phenomenologist who is 
most faithful to Husserl, expanded these inquiries in his project of 
non-dualistic reflection, especially in the amazing book he wrote 
at the end of his life, Le Visible et L’Invisible, where he explains his 
notion of “sur-reflection.” 
“We are catching sight of the necessity of another operation 
besides conversion to reflection, more fundamental than it, of a 
sort of “sur-réflection” [that] would not loose sight of the brute 
thing and the brute perception and would not finally efface them, 
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would not cut the organic bonds … [of] our mute contact with 
the world when they are not yet things said.… It must plunge into 
the world instead of surveying it.” 
Heidegger said something similar in Section 29: “Theoretical 
looking at the world has always flattened it down to the 
uniformity of what is purely objectively present.” [p. 138]. The 
Italian (It 401) is “Lo sguardo teoretico ha già sempre schermato il 
mondo sull’uniformità del mero sottomano…” That is, there is a 
leveling off that theory does that is the “bottleneck” of 
standardization that Jannis Kallinikos has spoken about 
[Kallinikos 2009]. 
Heidegger is sophisticated enough to recognize that theoretical 
cognition brings benefits as well as constraints. Continuing the 
Italian, “…un’uniformità dentro la quale, certo, è contenuta la 
nuova ricchezza di tutto quanto può essere svelato da un puro 
determinare”. Or in English, “… although, of course, a new 
abundance of what can be discovered in pure determination lies 
within that uniformity.” That is, it is also to be appreciated that 
there is an acknowledgement of the brilliance of formal analytic 
theorizing, a brilliance that we do not want to surrender. So the 
incredible situation that we are in as Homo sapiens (the humans 
who know) is how do we use formal knowing without letting it 
create a prison that we cannot escape. It seems there is more 
sapience that we Homo-s need to do. As human beings we are still 
at our task.  
What is this abundance, this richezza di conoscenza teoretica that 
“pure determination” brings us? And why is it that formal reason 
brings such abundance at the same time that it closes us off to the 
complexity of real events? We are not dispensing with formal 
analytic reason here; we are only teaching ourselves how to use it 
more wisely. 
Professor Giolo Fele and I are undertaking a study of coffee 
tasting. In particular we are examining how assaggiatore di caffè 
organize the intelligibility of the formal coffee descriptors they 
use. The formal terms they use, like “rich”, “medium bodied,” 
“acidic,” “rotondo,” “fiorito,” “vellutato,” etc. all permit them to 
locate tastes and stabilize the intelligibility of their sensory 
experience. We are also studying the benefits and limits the use of 
quantitative scales for tastes play in the coffee industry. We are 
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doing a real phenomenology of coffee tasting. We have already 
discovered that alongside making it possible for them to find, 
purchase and verify shipments of first-rate coffee, these terms 
affect the tasting. They close off some tastes, which have a 
difficult time being noted, while other tastes receive abundant 
scrutiny, to the point that the tongue is taught a great deal about 
how to find and distinguish precise flavors. 
One of Italy’s principal assaggiatore di caffè speaks of the tasting 
card in both positive and pejorative terms: “The card certainly 
plays an important role in guiding the judging procedures that 
apply. However, we must remember that it is only a tool, and the 
taster is responsible for recognizing and evaluating organoleptic 
characteristics. … The second [card] is based on thorough 
research aimed at modernizing the card by insisting that sensorial 
analysis is conducted with strict rules.” In Italian:  
“Non bisogna mai dimenticare che essa è solo uno strumento 
da capire e da utilizzare, la rilevazione delle caratteristiche 
organolettiche, la loro elaborazione in giudizi e la successiva 
espressione è di pertinenza del degustatore che mai potrà 
scaricarsi di questa responsibilità … la seconda [scheda], realizzata 
sulla scorta di una forte ricerca volta all’innovazione e in 
considerazione delle severe regole dell’anilisi sensoriale.” The 
seeming contradiction here is not a flaw in the procedure – formal 
analyses always and necessarily provide “elaborazione in giudizi” while 
at the same time cannot be made to substitute for the 
“responsabilità” to actually taste. As professional thinkers, we are 
continually trying to accomplish this very thing. 
2.3. Befindlichkeit 
Evidenz demands that we first taste, and Befindlichkeit, or 
Attunement, pays respect to an understanding that is more doing 
than it is knowing. It involves rigorous discipline, and just because 
the discipline is in life and not in words does not mean that it is 
not vital. “Attunement” is rendered in Italian as trovarsi, which is a 
reflexive verb. Reflexive verbs are really splendid things, because 
they already undermine the human conceit that we are always in 
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control of affairs. Take a verb like annoiarsi, “to become bored.” 
The logic of reflexive verbs better represents the actual situation 
than the non-reflective English. 
In the case of Befindlichkeit, it is a state one finds oneself in 
without any deliberate doing. As Heidegger (129) tells us, “[Mood] 
never comes from ‘without’ nor from ‘within,’ but rises from 
being-in-the-world itself.” Here Heidegger is referring to times 
when we grow tired of ourselves, when our being has become 
manifest to us as a burden, such as when we are bored. 
A closely related term that Heidegger uses is Umsicht, or 
“circumspective attention,” “la circumspectio” which is not quite 
“sapere,” “conoscenza,” or “conosciuto.” This is a preliminary taking of 
bearings that people do to find a context before they settle into it. 
It implies a broad sweep, and Heidegger contrasts it with the 
more invasive, paternalist strategies of technological manipulation. 
2.4. The Limits of Formal Analysis 
Much of the foundational experience that Heidegger is 
describing is not readily made the subject of formal investigations, 
at least not without distorting its basic character beyond 
recognition. Ciborra (p. 12) writes of Lucy Suchman’s findings: 
 “Her empirical study confirms that the organization of 
situated action is an emergent property of the moment-by-
moment interactions between actors and their relevant 
environments. Expert systems are built on a planning model of 
human action. ‘The model treats a plan as something located in 
the actor’s head.’”  
The proponents of “planning models,” which includes artificial 
intelligence designers and rational choice theorists but excludes 
the Oregon state highway planners, try to resolve difficulties by 
attempting to “embed into expert systems more and more sophisticated 
plans.” 
An exclusive reliance on more expert systems loses sight of 
Heidegger’s discovery that Dasein finds itself in a situation before 
beginning to reflect analytically, that a world already “matters to it” 
(129b) (“potere-essere-toccato”, It. 399b) before knowing. And 
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this is where occurs most of the confusions experienced by the 
users of Xerox machines that are documented by Suchman. 
Dasein has always found itself “always already” (128a/ già 
sempre trovato, It. 391c) in a finding which does not come from a 
direct seeking (trovato in un trovare che non scaturisce tanto da 
un diretto cercare). Heidegger comes down very severely on this 
‘diretto cercare’. But this is just what most of our research consists 
of! Even my work in ethnomethodology is full of ‘diretto cercare,’ 
which will increase the likelihood that that I miss the dimension 
that is most important, at least according to Heidegger.  
The more that formal analytic investigators inspect a situation 
the less they will see. Heidegger (127c) observes, “The that of 
facticity is never to be found by looking.” The Italian is, “Il fatto-
che della fatticità non è mai reperibile in un vedere intuitivo” (It. 
391b). That is because looking - un diretto cercare - is already 
looking for something it has in mind; that is, one already has the 
frame of the experience built – one’s mind is so full of what one 
already knows that one cannot see what one does not know! Why 
do we want to do research, if we do not want find out what we do 
not yet know? It may be called “positive science,” but it is deluded 
just the same. The Tibetans I lived with have a great name for 
such delusion: they call it “ignorance” (ma rig ma). For Tibetans, it 
is not what you don’t know that makes you ignorant, it is what 
you do know. That is, one’s mind is so filled with the certainty of 
what one does know that there is no room to learn anything new. 
Especially, there is no room to learn what one does not already 
know. 
There is no better model to be found for the imperialism of 
planful theorizing than in the social theories of Thomas Hobbes, 
John Locke, and John Stuart Mill. They offer an extreme 
rationalism whereby humans are born as separate individuals, 
come together out of their own free will, and then commence to 
abstractly negotiate their rights in a social contract. This is nothing 
more than a “just-so” story about the origin of society. People 
know nothing more than what these rationalist theorists put into 
their heads. It may be that people do not know more, but they do a 
great deal more than Hobbes, et. al. are able to account for. And 
this “more” is fairly well addressed by Heidegger in Section 29. 
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There is planful action as pre-determined rationalities, and 
then there is planful action as the actual course of the situated 
action, as bricolage, as difference, as reflexivity, and all the other ways 
we are learning to think – or not to think – about these quotidian 
activities that are the preoccupation of information system 
researchers. In his masterpiece Negative Dialectics, Theodor Adorno 
speaks of mimesis, a mode of social being that precedes formal 
reflection, and he considers it more critical to understanding than 
conceptual knowing (and we should not fail to note here that 
Adorno was a sworn opponent of Heidegger for all of his 
professional life). 
Heidegger’s fecund recommendation is instead of 
commandeering events, instead of “staring out at something” 
(129b) with “un guardar fisso”/ “Empfinded oder Anstarren” (It 399a 
/G137a), we should regard things in “a circumspectfully heedful 
way” (Il pro-curante … circonspettivo). In this way we can listen 
to the phenomena we are studying and not exclusively take charge 
of organizing the intelligibility of it in advance, like we are running 
the railways. 
2.5. Conclusion 
This does not mean we have to leave off of formal analysis, 
but it does mean that we must first attune ourselves to what is 
there. Or if we are doing social research, we must first witness 
how others attune themselves to what is there, and we must find their 
there (not our “there”). That is, using Husserl’s language, our 
professional task is to identify and describe what are the horizons 
of their experience, and especially what are the horizons of their 
understanding that are at work for the people we are studying. 
Only then will our professional advice be pertinent to the 
organizational tasks that people are facing in their quotidian life.  
An important question for those who wish to work in a 
phenomenological way is how do we get access to the non-
rational? This is a thorny question since the tools we have to work 
with are mostly rational tools. So how do we adapt them and 
make them sensitive to the actual “work” that people are doing in 
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their everyday, practical lives? There is a vital clue for us in the 
concluding passage of § 29, in which Heidegger writes, “The 
phenomenological interpretation must give to Dasein itself the 
possibility of primordial disclosure and let it, so to speak, interpret 
itself.” (131b). ‘Letting things be’ is the theme Heidegger writes a 
great deal about in his post-World War II writings, but it is only 
another way of reciting the principal phenomenological slogan 
from Being and Time, “To the things themselves!” 
Our work of making social inquiries is not irrelevant, because 
we have the important descriptive task, Heidegger tells us, of 
raising “the phenomenal content of disclosure existentially to a 
conceptual level” (in Italian, “elevare al concetto l’importo 
fenomenale cosí dischiuso,” It. 403). That is, our thinking must be 
kept appropriate to the events we are describing, and we must 
avoid submerging those events beneath our brilliant plans and 
theories, but we still need to reflect formally upon them. 
So now have our most serious task – how do we teach each 
other speak objectively about these subjective things? 
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3. AFTERWORD 
 
 GIAN MARCO CAMPAGNOLO1, YLENIA CURZI2, 
 GIANLUIGI VISCUSI3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Understanding is rarely the deductive process that Isaac Newton would want to 
talk about.” [Liberman, Alpis 2009] 
 
In his contribution to this book, Kenneth Liberman furnishes 
a series of concepts and hypotheses for the interpretation of 
concrete social phenomena. He also puts forward a number of 
suggestions concerning the strategy to be adopted by social 
research which seeks to support social and organizational 
practices in the solution of real and concrete problems. 
The aim of this afterword is to be an “ideal prolongation” 
which proceeds in three directions in analysing the concepts, 
hypotheses, and research strategy put forward by Liberman. More 
specifically, the first section shows how the concepts proposed by 
Liberman make it possible to recast the idea and the use of formal 
representations – which part of the literature on information 
systems considers to be at odds with situated actions and analyses 
– in a manner consistent with an approach to the study and design 
of information systems based on emotionally situated 
understanding. 
 The second section concentrates on ‘action research’ – namely 
that form of empirical research which seeks to combine theory 
and practice, research and action for change – and it investigates 
the consequences of the orientation of such research to the 
cognitive strategy proposed by Liberman. 
 Finally, the third section highlights the changes which have 
taken place in the practices of producing information systems for 
                                                                                    
1 Gian Marco Campagnolo is author of Section 3.3. 
2 Ylenia Curzi is author of the introductory paragraph and of Section 3.2. 
3 Gianluigi Viscusi is author of Section 3.1. 
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organizations. It argues that, although these changes do not 
challenge the validity of Liberman’s phenomenological theory in 
regard to the interpretation of software production practices, they 
nevertheless require its integration when such practices are 
connoted as contemporary and post-local social phenomena. 
3.1. From formal representations to subjective objectivity: evidence and 
reflexivity in information systems as an area of research  
Clarification of the meaning of analysis in situation of an 
information system necessarily requires examination of the role of 
the researcher and the practices that enable him or her to access 
the context to be analysed. In this regard, Kenneth Liberman’s 
article in this book is already important because of the question 
with which it starts: “How can my participation be useful?”.  
 However, it is first necessary to provide a brief description of 
what is meant by information system. Among the various 
definitions proposed in the literature, we regard as sufficiently 
complete and useful for our purposes the one proposed by 
Buckingham, Hirschheim et al. [1987], for whom an information 
system is: “[…] a system which assembles, stores, processes and 
delivers information relevant to an organisation (or to a society), 
in such a way that the information is accessible and useful to 
those who wish to use it […] An information system is a human 
activity (social) system which may or not involve the use of 
computer systems[…]”. Firstly, this definition highlights what is 
meant in general by the term system in the expression 
‘information system’: The set of actors (people, objects, 
procedures, etc.) that interact to obtain, produce, and distribute 
information useful to the participants/users. Secondly, it specifies 
that an information system does not necessarily have to make use 
of a computer (or ICT, as one would say today). In particular, an 
information system has the use of information as its purpose. 
Following Batini, De Petra et al. [2008], we consider information 
to be everything that produces a change in a person’s stock of 
knowledge; whilst data can be defined as “recordings of the 
description of some characteristic of reality on a support which 
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guarantees its conservation, and by means of a system of signs 
which ensures its comprehensibity and retrievability” [Batini et al. 
2008 - translation of the author]. Information is therefore such 
because it is significant and comprehensible to people or groups 
of people, whilst data refer to the support on which those data are 
recorded and the language with which they are described [Avison; 
Fitzgerald 1995; Batini et al. 2008]. Information and data are 
therefore closely connected and stand in a systemic and formal 
relationship with the other actors involved in an information 
system. However, corresponding to this integrated view is a 
specialization of the research consisting in studies which analyse, 
on the one hand, the economic-organizational aspects of 
information (an information system as an organizational system), 
and on the other, aspects more closely connected with the 
processing of data and information by means of technologies 
(information technology system). This fragmentation gives rise to 
a separation which, in Heideggerian terms, is a forgetfulness 
which entails consideration of the various entities encountered in 
analyses of information systems in terms of ‘simple presence’ or 
‘presence at hand’ [Heidegger 2006]. To consider entities in their 
simple presence is  to privilege a type of formal knowledge that 
distracts the researcher from the evidence that the world is always 
open to an emotionally situated understanding reducible only at 
the cost of a loss. In fact, the attention is often mostly focused on 
“formalised information systems” [Avison et al. 1995] through 
formal approaches based on rules and clear structures rather than 
on logical-mathematical models. In this regard, the study by 
D’Atri, Spagnoletti et al. [2009], which analyses the MIT Beer 
Game as specifically adapted to training in supply chain 
management, well emphasises the value added and the situational 
limitations of formal approaches like simulations: “The MIT Beer 
Game and our versions experienced similar limitations: firstly, the 
difficulty of providing a realistic vision of the supply chain 
management. Secondly: it is true that the game structure (where 
middlemen are placed on parallel lines) allows the retailer to 
choose suppliers but despite this, it cannot be compared to the 
actual complexities of a supply chain [D’Atri et al. 2009].” 
The question of the formalization of thought [Liberman 2007], 
or of formal representations, is therefore the background which 
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makes Liberman’s theoretical contribution useful to the research 
community on information systems, also and especially because of 
the epistemological status of information systems as a discipline. 
In fact, this area of inquiry seems to figure among the human 
sciences considered in the sense envisaged by Michel Foucault in 
The Order of Things [Foucault 1966]. From this perspective, the 
human sciences arise from the interstices among (i) mathematics 
and physics, (ii) the sciences that seek to define human beings in 
the terms of their lives (biology), their language (linguistics), their 
work (economics), and (iii) philosophy. Our purpose here is not 
to conduct detailed analysis of the perspective introduced by 
Foucault [1966], but rather to highlight the borderline nature of 
the human sciences, which make use of concepts and methods 
from the above-mentioned disciplines but do not identify with 
any of them: “at one level or another, [they use] mathematical 
formalization; they proceed in accordance with models or 
concepts borrowed from biology, economics, and the sciences of 
language” [Foucault 1966, translation of the author]. What is 
distinctive of the human sciences, finally, is that they furnish 
representations of each of the dimensions proper to their adjoining 
disciplines [Foucault 1966]. Given these premises, the role of the 
models and formalizations – that is, of representations – allocate a 
particular place among the human sciences to information 
systems, where the concept of representation solicits their analysis 
and design. Important in this regard are the findings of Kern, 
Zirpins et al. [2009], who show the challenges that architectures 
oriented to services and technologies raise for the rationalization 
of work and the definition of appropriate quality standards, with 
potential consequences for the concept itself of work as it arose in 
industrial society, but also as it is today in the services society. 
Such systems, in fact, alter the very notion of work routine in 
terms of schedules, skills, and contracts between employees and 
employers, and they redefine business models and 
professionalism. In this context, it is necessary to understand the 
consequences produced by the forgetfulness of emotionally 
situated work, namely the fact that abstract, formalized and 
standardized tasks are considered tout court the work. Whereas, 
they are generated from living and emotionally denoted work 
activities, not easily de-composables. Indeed, these service 
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oriented and collective work systems overcome the lack of 
scalability of the situated work by detaching representations of 
activities that can be (potentially) infinitely disaggregated and 
recomposed. 
The role of formal representations has been at the centre of 
animated debate in the area of information systems [Ciborra 2002; 
Suchman 1987; Winograd 1987; Flores 1987]. The main objective 
of the debate has been to show the limitations of a certain vision 
of rationality, often denoted with the generic heading of 
positivism, whose naiveté, as rightly pointed out by Liberman in a 
philosophical context broader than that of information systems, 
resides in the fact that it investigates “the truth of a world that is 
presumed to exist just in the way it is being interrogated” 
[Liberman 2007]. Experience is somehow obscured and forgotten 
as the source of the theory, which changes from being explanatory 
to foundational and cogent at the ontological level: that is, as 
already given and as the truth of experience. Heidegger’s thought 
has provided important theoretical support in this regard 
[Winograd et al. 1987] by showing how enunciations have been 
considered the repositories of truth in the history of metaphysics, 
but neglecting that truth originates in the interpreting and 
understanding being-in-world. That which in very general terms is 
to be emphasised here is the relationship between enunciation 
(considered as formalization) and theoretical knowledge. To 
simplify, Heidegger considers theoretical knowledge to be a 
descriptive attitude to the truth of entities, without their 
consideration within the set of references that characterize their 
usability. In theoretical knowledge the world emerges as being-at-
hand (Vorhandenheit), and the truth of entities is communicated 
through enunciations (Aussage). In this regard, Liberman quotes 
the following passage from Being and Time (in the Italian 
translation: “[...]lo sguardo teoretico ha già sempre schermato il 
mondo sull’uniformità del mero sottomano[...]” [Liberman 2007]. 
In a certain sense, therefore, theoretical knowledge isolates 
understanding from the other modalities of the Dasein [Heidegger 
2006], particularly by separating it from the affective situation 
which indicates that being exceeds knowing. Although criticisms 
of the rationalist perspective typical of positivist approaches to 
research do not add a great deal to what has already been said in 
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the debate engendered by publication of the book by Winograd et 
al. [1987], Liberman’s reference in his article to a text by Ciborra 
[Ciborra 2006] is a step forward in identifying another ‘naiveté’ 
little emphasised by criticism. Ciborra shows that also approaches 
to the situated analysis of information systems fail to grasp the 
‘core’ of practices, and thus reduce the extent and originality of 
the emotional situation [Ciborra 2006]. Moreover, the relative 
novelty that Liberman seeks to emphasise is, in a certain sense, the 
fact that Heidegger shows how to overcome the opposition 
between the objectifying views distant from the evidence 
(Evidenz) which should be at the basis of research – i.e. attention 
to experience in situ – regardless of every partial representation or 
theoretical model applicable to it considered in terms of realism. 
Heidegger, in fact, warns against confusing the existential-
ontological demonstration of theoretical-cognitive knowledge 
based on the emotional situation with the subjugation of science 
to feeling. This would be to replace one ‘naiveté’ with another. It 
is instead necessary to acknowledge the partiality of the theoretical 
knowledge that always arises from interpretation of an 
understanding emotionally situated in the world. Rigorous 
research must therefore relate the entity given at hand – the object 
of theoretical knowledge – to the interpretation on which it is 
founded. In this regard, Viscusi [2009] seeks to show the value of 
a methodology able to maintain the correct critical distance 
between formalization and the context of intervention in the 
planning of eGovernment initiatives. It is necessary to recognize, 
as Liberman shows, that there is no objectivity which is not 
accompanied by interpretation; there is always a ‘subjective 
objectivity’. Here ‘subjective’ does not refer to cognitive activity, 
but rather to local situatedness in a context of emotionally 
characterized practical referrals. Consequently, formal representa-
tions should not be eliminated and replaced with partial and 
objectifying perspectives which define what situated experience is 
a priori. Rather, in research on information systems and their 
design, it is necessary to render data and formal representations 
into “living classifications” [Bowker; Star 1999]. To be stressed 
here is the importance of the reflexivity of understanding 
whereby, as Liberman puts it, “the understanding is always 
describing itself”. 
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The theme of the reflexivity of understanding and of the 
models adopted in organizations or in social research has been 
addressed by various authors [Bourdieu 1992; Giddens 1984; 
Orlikowski 1992; Rabinow 2008]. To be emphasised is that 
recognizing the reflexivity of understanding is an important 
prerequisite if formal representations are to be used to gain access 
to the practices distinctive of a particular context of action. 
Relevant here is the concept of ‘boundary object’ [Star; Griesemer 
1989], which refers to those particular objects that make it 
possible to develop, maintain and integrate knowledge deriving 
from different ‘social worlds’4. ‘Boundary objects’ may be material 
objects, but they may also be abstract ones such as organizational 
forms, procedures, maps, categories and schemes of classification. 
Given their capacity to assume different meanings in 
heterogeneous social worlds, whilst maintaining a common and 
translatable meaning, ‘boundary objects’ are considered to be 
interfaces for the production of knowledge, and they are often 
constructed and naturalized as ecological systems [Bowker et al. 
1999]. ‘Boundary objects’ are therefore in the first instance 
physical boundaries – that is, artifacts in which are inscribed what 
we have identified as ‘conceptual boundaries’ or ‘formal 
representations’ able to guide actors. Such conceptual ‘boundaries’ 
may perform the twofold role that Schmidt [1997] has identified 
for formal constructs in cooperative work. On the one hand, 
according to a conception that gives a ‘weak’ role to such 
constructs in real situations of interaction (in that they are 
‘external to those situations and not reducible to them), they are 
maps furnishing an encoded representation of the domain and the 
activities performed within it. On the other, according to a 
normative conception of formal constructs, they are scripts 
furnishing on the one hand a limited selection of valid, permitted 
and safe actions, and on the other – by difference and exclusion – 
a series of actions which are not allowed or inadvisable. In both 
cases, formal constructs understood as either maps or scripts are 
resources and constraints – affordances [Gibson 1979] – in 
physical and social circumstances [Schmidt 1997].  
                                                                                    
4 On this see Hughes [1970]. 
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Braccini [2009] provides an example of how a system can 
support the sharing of knowledge in the way that archaeologists 
manage and conserve the artistic and cultural heritage. In this 
case, an integrated information system acts as a ‘boundary object’ 
for its various users (archaeologists, archivists, renovators, etc.) 
because it enables them to create personalized views, and to add 
new data by structuring them according to the contextual 
requirements of technologies like RFID. The representation 
therefore supports the traceability of the archaeological find by 
basing it on the experiential context, never reifying it into a 
specific and unalterable formalization.  
In the case of information systems, therefore, we have a 
twofold instance of translation and integration: on the one hand, 
there are different communities of users; on the other, the need to 
formalize discursive practices so that they can be processed in an 
information technology system5. Classification systems thus make 
it possible to model shared domains, but they also assume the 
features of technologies of the self [Foucault 1975] in that they 
lose the flexibility of ‘boundary objects’, becoming standards with 
political and social implications, and losing the traces of their 
construction through discursive and non-discursive practices 
deriving from heterogeneous communities. Hence, when a formal 
representation loses the evidence of its reflexivity and presents 
itself as the only possible truth;  indeed, a truth which concerns 
what it has to explain, but which, from this perspective, must 
already presuppose it.   
Liberman accordingly shows us how phenomenology can 
favour the use of formal representations in a truly situated 
approach to the study and design of information systems by 
clarifying the role of the reflexivity of understanding and the 
significance of the evidence of an emotionally interpreting 
subjective objectivity. 
 
                                                                                    
5 According to Carlo Sini, every writing brings out a threshold of the world, which it 
depicts. For mathematical writing, in which we can discern the origin of informatic writing, 
this threshold of representation is the scheme “by which the world is schematized (its 
specific miniaturization)” [Sini 1997]. The danger lies in absorbing the depictable (the 
world) in the depicted (in this case the scheme) so that the origin of the meaning depicted 
may be forgotten. 
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3.2. Research and intervention upon social and organizational systems: what 
strategy of study? 
‘Action research’ is a form of empirical research in which there 
are indissoluble linkages between theory and practice, research 
and intervention, knowledge and change [Albano, forthcoming]. 
Action research, in fact, consists in analysis and reflection 
conducted in (social and/or organizational) practice. Its purpose is 
to produce knowledge useful for the solution of a concrete 
problem, and it is instrumentally oriented to change [Albano, 
forthcoming; Bonzanini; De Masi 1984; Gilli 1971; Lewin 1946].  
This brief outline serves to frame the direction of analysis 
suggested by Hermann [2009], Wagner et al. [2009], Bratteteig 
[2009] and Liberman [2009] in papers given at Alpis 2009, the first 
ones in the session devoted to action research, the last in the 
opening session.  
The proposal by Hermann [2009], Wagner et al. [2009] and, at 
least implicitly, by Bratteteig [2009] can be summarized as follows. 
If action research is to produce knowledge useful for the solution 
of a concrete problem, it should be conducted in a manner which 
makes it possible to bring out and consider the multiple, different, 
and often conflicting points of view of the agents in a 
social/organizational system with respect to the possible desired 
directions of change, the ways to achieve it, and the specific 
characteristics of the situation studied. As evidenced by Wagner et 
al. [2009] in particular, this yields a shared understanding of the 
problem and a shared notion of the solution.  
Liberman’s [2009] paper does not specifically deal with action 
research. However, it puts forward a suggestion that we may set in 
relation to those made by the other contributions cited, namely 
the recommended orientation to a strategy of study such as 
expressed by the following concepts drawn from the 
phenomenology of Heidegger and Husserl: Befindlichkeit, 
Evidenz, Umsicht. According to this strategy, the task of the 
researcher is to discover and describe the plurality of horizons of 
experience and interpretation (points of view, we might say) of the 
various agents whom s/he studies in regard to the situation 
studied. To this end, the researcher should first ‘attune’ 
him/herself to what is happening in the situation or, better, 
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observe how the agents ‘attune’ themselves to what is happening 
in the situation in which they are acting. Only subsequently can 
the researcher organize, by means of concepts and theories, the 
intelligibility of what s/he has observed. Liberman [2009] stresses 
that precisely because of these features, this strategy allows the 
researcher to yield suggestions pertinent to the real problems that 
people face in their quotidian work of organizing the local 
situation. 
These observations, jointly considered, prompt reflection on 
the implications of an orientation of action research to the 
strategy underlying phenomenological research as briefly 
described above. Our hypothesis is that if the implications of the 
orientation of action research to the strategy in question are to be 
made intelligible, it is first necessary to render intelligible the 
presupposition of that same strategy. To this end, given the 
perspective adopted, we shall concentrate on the logical structure 
of the latter. In particular, we shall refer to the work of von 
Wright [1971, chapters 1 and 3]. 
 von Wright maintains that the cognitive strategy underlying 
phenomenological research consists in understanding the meaning 
of human and social action on the basis of the sense intended by 
the actors, that is, on the basis of their desires, motives, acts of 
will, and their intentions, reasons, and beliefs concerning 
means/ends relationships.  
 von Wright highlights that understanding can be expressed by 
a practical syllogism consisting of a major premise stating that an 
agent has the intention to bring about p; a minor premise which 
describes the agent’s cognitive attitudes, his/her beliefs about the 
means required to bring about p (“A believes that s/he cannot 
bring about p unless s/he does a”); and a conclusion which 
describes a behaviour consistent with the premises (“A sets 
him/herself to do a” or “A does a”).  
Finally, von Wright argues in logical terms that it is not possible to 
consider the practical syllogism – and therefore understanding of 
the meaning of action on the basis of the sense given to it by the 
actors – as a form of nomological-deductive explanation [Hempel 
1966]. He specifies that this latter presupposes that it is possible 
to explain and predict an individual fact by subsuming it under a 
general law which expresses a relationship of sufficient 
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conditionship between cause and effect [von Wright 1971, pp. 38, 
58], and of which the production of the fact is an instance. 
Hence, insofar as the practical syllogism does not express a 
nomological-deductive explanation of the action, the connection 
between its premises and its conclusion is not a relationship of 
sufficient conditionship which can be used to predict the 
occurrence of behaviour on the basis of the agent’s known 
intentions and cognitive attitudes. In this regard, von Wright 
specifies that the necessity of the practical syllogism is conceived 
ex post actu, and that understanding of the meaning of the action 
on the basis of the sense intended by the actor is a construction 
from a given conclusion of premises consistent with it and 
corresponding to it. In other words, it is an a posteriori justification 
of a behaviour observed to occur; a re-construction made after or 
during the action of the intentions and reasons, of the motives, 
desires, acts of will and cognitive attitudes underlying the 
behaviour of actors. 
What has been highlighted by von Wright clarifies in logical 
terms the presupposition on which is based understanding of the 
meaning of human and social action on the basis of the sense 
intended by the actors, that is the denial of every possibility of 
prediction and the consequent precedence given to the 
observation of what happens in the individual concrete case as 
against the organization of its intelligibility.  
Moreover, the reference to von Wright’s contribution makes it 
possible to highlight the implications of the orientation of action 
research to the strategy in question on the logical level. To this 
end, we now separately consider the phase of reflection conducted 
in (social and/or organizational) practice on a problem requiring a 
solution and the phase of action for change. 
During the reflection phase, orientation to a strategy that 
assumes the impossibility of predicting the occurrence of a 
behaviour on the basis of the agents’ intentions and cognitive 
attitudes makes it possible to take account of the fact- emphasised 
by Liberman [2009]- that the course of action is characterized by 
phenomena such as reflexivity, bricolage, and unanticipated 
consequences. Moreover, since this strategy assumes the 
impossibility of prediction, it gives precedence to the observation 
of what is happening in an individual concrete case as against its 
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interpretation through concepts and theories, thereby expressing 
itself in the a posteriori reconstruction of the meaning of what has 
happened. Therefore, the orientation to this strategy offers the 
opportunity- highlighted by Liberman [2009]- to discover and 
learn what is not already known and does not conform with a 
previously constructed conceptual scheme. Finally, it allows 
account to be taken of those unique elements of the course of 
action which escape the idea of “conformity with a genus” and 
therefore the subsumption under a general law. Put otherwise: 
because of the presupposition of the strategy in question, which 
implies that it expresses itself in the a posteriori reconstruction of 
the meaning of action in a particular concrete case, the orientation 
of action research to this strategy offers, in the reflection phase, 
the opportunity to take account of aspects of the phenomena 
observed which are not grasped when action research is oriented 
to the positivist strategy based on the opposite presupposition.  
The presupposition that offers these possibilities during the 
reflection phase precludes others in the phase of action for 
change. In fact, if change (the solution of a concrete problem) is 
considered to be the aim pursued by the actors, the orientation to 
the strategy underlying phenomenological research entails that the 
change, and beliefs concerning the means to achieve it, are 
reconstructed ex post from observation of the behaviour of the 
agents and as premises consistent with that behaviour and 
corresponding to it. If instead change (the solution of a concrete 
problem) is the phenomenon observed, the orientation to the 
strategy in question entails that the change is justified a posteriori or 
during the observation through the re-construction of agents’ 
intentions, and beliefs about the means to fulfil them, that are 
consistent with and corresponding to the change observed. 
These considerations are not intended to suggest that, in 
action research oriented to the strategy underlying 
phenomenological research, the activity of reflection cannot be 
‘connected’ with a change. In fact, as it has been pointed out 
[Maggi 2003, chapter III.2; Albano, forthcoming], by virtue of the 
interpretation of what has happened, people can acquire greater 
awareness of the system of action and power relations in which 
they are embedded. They can also develop new intentions, desires, 
motives, reasons for action, and new beliefs concerning the means 
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required to realize them; and this may also be followed by a 
change in the action system made by the actors in order to serve 
their own interests.  
These considerations highlight that, due to the presupposition 
on which is based understanding of the meaning of action on the 
basis of the sense given to it by the actors, action research 
consistently oriented to this strategy is unable to offer any prior 
indications concerning the means required to achieve change (or 
to solve a concrete problem) when this is regarded as the purpose 
or the intention of the actors. Nor is it able to offer prior 
indications concerning the change (or the solution of a concrete 
problem) when this is regarded as the means to realize other 
intentions of the agents. We believe that this aspect should be 
emphasised, because Liberman’s [2009] article might be taken to 
suggest the reverse, especially in the passage arguing that only 
when use is made of the strategy underlying phenomenological 
research can the researcher offer suggestions pertinent to the real 
problems that agents have to face in the situation studied. 
In this section we have discussed the implications of an 
orientation of action research to the strategy underlying 
phenomenological research, starting with the elucidation of that 
strategy’s presupposition. To this end, we have concentrated on 
its logical structure, drawing on von Wright [1971]. Although this 
is not the only possible approach, we nevertheless believe that it 
helps give full intelligibility to both the possibilities offered by an 
orientation of action research to the strategy in question and those 
precluded. In other words, we believe that this makes it possible 
to clarify, in relation to action research, the consequences of 
exploiting the possibilities offered by this strategy in terms of the 
loss of other possibilities. In regard to this aspect, the reflection 
conducted and its implications are primarily addressed to the 
operators that have to, or desire to, choose an approach to action 
research. In developing them, we have considered the approach to 
action research as a form of meaningful human action, and we 
have sought to adopt the perspective indicated by Weber [1904], 
who, in conclusion, we would like to quote briefly: “All thoughtful 
reflection on the ultimate elements of meaningful human action is 
primarily tied to the categories of ‘end’ and ‘means’. We want 
something concretely either ‘for its own sake’ or as a means for 
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achieving something else which is more highly desired. The 
suitability of the means to given ends is the prime question 
accessible to scientific consideration. [...] Taking into account the 
bounds of our knowledge, if the conditions for attaining a given 
end seem to be present, we can determine the consequences of 
the application of the requisite means besides the attainment of 
the intended end [...]. In this way we offer to the actor the 
possibility [...] to answer the question: what does attainment of the 
desired end ‘cost’ in the context of loss […] of other values? [...] 
No person behaving reflectively and responsibility can avoid this 
balancing of the ends of an action against its consequences; and 
one of the most important functions of the technical criticism 
considered so far is to provide for this. Turning an assessment of 
this kind into a decision is certainly not the business of science, 
but of the desiring person [...]. In the making of such a decision 
we can further offer knowledge of the significance of what is 
wished for. We can elucidate the desired ends between which he 
chooses according to context and significance, first of all by 
indicating and developing in a logically consistent manner the 
‘ideas’ that do, or can, underlie the concrete end [...] considered in 
their content and in their ultimate axioms, as well as in the 
consequences that logically and practically they derive from their 
realization. [...] Whether these ultimate standards [axioms] should 
be acknowledged by the […] subject is his own affair, a question 
of his desire and conscience, and his personal view of the world”. 
3.3. The historical evolution and the geographical expansion of the practice of 
producing information systems for organizations 
This section argues that when a practice extends across space 
and time, it requires the renewal of the analytical categories 
necessary for its understanding. This thesis will be illustrated by 
surveying the papers given at the Alpis session on social studies 
concerning information systems. It will use the concepts proposed 
by Kenneth Liberman’s phenomenological treatment of situated 
studies, starting from the thought of Martin Heidegger. 
Enumeration will be made of the concepts proposed by the 
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phenomenological approach as derived from situated studies 
[Suchman 1987], with discussion of its applicability in the current 
context of practices for the design of information systems, a 
domain in which situated studies have been successfully applied. It 
will be asked whether the extension in space and time of design 
practices, the fact that they result from intricate international 
dynamics distributed among a multiplicity of actors – with the 
consequent change in design methods due to the greater 
processing capacity and memory of computers, as well as to their 
ubiquity – make a difference with respect to the categories used 
by phenomenology and the situated studies approach to 
understand the limitations of the design of information systems as 
“formal analysis” [Liberman 2009, p.11]. Then it will be proposed 
that the conceptual and methodological categories thet emerged 
from the Alpis session on social studie sof technological markets 
are as better suited to understand software production as a 
comtemporary and post-local social phenomenon.  
The solutions to the problem of the unpredictability of the 
events perceived by the designers of Xerox photocopiers in the 
1980s, of which Liberman speaks in his ALPIS paper with 
reference to Suchman [1987], have evolved over time. The current 
solution seems no longer to be that of incorporating “more and 
more sophisticated plans” [Ciborra 2006; see Suchman 1987] into 
expert systems. In 2009 the design of information systems appears 
to be the business of large multinational companies which have 
evolved their technological products over decades of experience 
in relationships with users. The designer is no longer a single 
individual relying on formal calculations to anticipate the possible 
uses of a system. Perhaps because design firms are aware of the 
reflexivity of our understanding, and because of their 
phenomenological awareness that the “describing is the 
constituting” [Liberman, p.4], they realize that the more formal 
analysis is used to investigate a situation, the more that situation 
changes – and they seem to apply this principle knowingly and 
competently. In this regard, the business information systems of 
the multinational companies dealing in management software 
increasingly take the form of standard pre-packaged products. 
Such products embody the ways in which tasks are structured by 
the ‘average’ of clients in each of the production sectors for which 
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the supplier offers products. The pre-packaged product does not 
claim to match local uses. Rather, it offers guarantees concerning 
a series of other advantages. Because it is a standard product, 
unless major changes are made to it by the user, it can be reliably 
maintained on-line by the manufacturing firm. Moreover, the 
supplier establishes partnerships with a series of local 
subcontractors, to which it cedes the flourishing market of system 
‘personalizations’ and management of the problem of the 
unpredictability of events in regard to the personalized versions of 
the system.  
During the Alpis session of social studies on technological 
markets, various papers proposed concepts for a social analysis 
able to keep abreast with the evolution of technological markets 
and the consequent evolution of what is meant by developing an 
information system for organization. In this regard, the paper by 
Neil Pollock [Pollock 2009] considered how consultants classify 
and organize emerging technology markets. It showed that when a 
specific type of consultant – the industrial analyst – discusses the 
emergence of a new technology they also define the state of the 
technological industry and its future development. Pollock’s paper 
focused on the process of categorization applied by industrial 
analysts and on the variety of terms used to differentiate among 
very similar artifacts. Instead of perceiving nomination solely as a 
cognitive limitation – a form which in referring to Heidegger can 
be called ‘concealment’ in the organization of the intelligibility of 
the artifact software in its organizational use – Pollock shows how 
these partial categories are deliberately used by industrial analysts 
both to order (and to represent) the technological market, to give 
it form and to generate effects on other actors, such as software 
companies and users. The socio-political procedure of the 
intermediaries in what Pollock calls the “technological field” 
[Pollock 2009, p. ...] cannot be related to the formal and analytical 
accounts of rational choice theorists in sociology and political 
science, and it cannot be described solely in terms of the cognitive 
performance of a single individual. Just as the Oregon State 
Highway Department of which Liberman speaks was aware of the 
limitedness of its planning model, and consequently implemented 
all ideas concerning road signage systems on a trial basis before 
their definitive use [“put on the back-burner”, Liberman, p.5], so 
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the multinational companies that today produce the information 
systems used throughout the world by organizations and their 
members (IBM, SAP, Oracle, Microsoft, etc.) proceed according 
to a cognitive paradigm more distant than can be imagined from 
Isaac Newton’s deductive process.  
The operations of multinational companies in the production 
of software stand in relation to the deductive process and the 
planning model of the expert systems designer in the same way as 
the ‘big sciences’ stand in relation to the ‘small sciences’ described 
by Harris [1998]. By comparing the mappings of all the 
constituent parts of the scientific knowledge projects at the 
beginnings of modern science with those of the age of 
geographical discoveries, Harris shows how the development and 
initial use of the astronomical telescope and pneumatic equipment 
were ‘small enterprises’, because their construction required the 
labour of a few people for a brief period of time in a restricted 
geographical context. By contrast, in the mapping of South 
America, the assembly of a cabinet of curiosities and the 
construction of a taxonomy of quadrupeds were ‘big enterprises’ 
because they required long-term labour by a large number of 
people distributed across a broad geographical area [James Harris 
1998, pp. 275-6]. We propose here that the status of big science 
should also be assigned to software production. 
 On investigating what principle of jurisdiction governs the 
actors working within the ‘big enterprises’ of software production 
in technology markets, Antonios Kaniadikis introduces the notion 
of the “Agora of techno-organizational change” in his Alpis 
paper. This expression refers to the emergence and expansion in 
the global context of a market for the resources necessary to 
undertake technological change in businesses. These resources 
comprise technologies like information systems and software 
packages, technical and managerial expertise, methodologies for 
the management of change, project management skills, and others 
besides. The Agora of techno-organizational change is populated 
by heterogeneous actors (suppliers, users, intermediaries, 
consultants, analysts, states, professional associations, and so on) 
actors with conflicting (or otherwise) interests and diverse points 
of view.  
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The uncertainty and confusion of industrial practices reflect a 
similar situation in academic research. The interdisciplinary study 
of technological and organizational innovation appears 
fragmented and unable to grasp analytically and explore in 
integrated manner the emergence and taking shape of a global 
market for techno-organizational change. In particular, although a 
recent focus by situated studies on the phase of technological 
implementation – which has come about in opposition to 
technocratic analysis – is informative, it has created an analytical 
gap which leaves the broader context of socio-economic 
relationships unexplored. Campagnolo, in his paper given at Alpis 
[Campagnolo 2009], talked in this regard about how the methods 
of social researchers (and in particular the research design with 
which they conduct fieldwork) reflexively gives shape to the 
analysis. Designing research on a technology’s implementation 
which concentrates exclusively on the context of the client 
organization, and only during the period in which the researcher 
has access to the field, will necessarily emphasise the local aspects 
of work practices in the user organization as being different from 
those supported by the technological supply. It is a different 
matter how the supplier organization can respond to the variety of 
requests made by users notwithstanding the idiosyncrasy of each 
organizational context, so that interest shifts from the importing 
of organizational solutions to an interest in their exporting. Social 
analysis of this context requires methodologies which consider a 
broader space-time horizon. Quoting George Marcus, 
Campagnolo suggests multi-sited ethnography as one of these 
possible methodologies with which to construct the field: “Words, 
objects and identities take their meaning through their circulation 
in diffused time-space [...]. Tracing cultural formations becomes a 
mobile activity” [Marcus 1995, p.96].  
To resume the flow of Kenneth Liberman’s reflections, we 
must now return whence we began: the theme of formal analysis 
and the fact that, as Liberman says, “understanding is rarely the 
deductive process that Isaac Newton would want to talk about”. 
To what type of practice today corresponds what Heidegger called 
“direct seeking”? It is true that the Dasein (the being-there) is 
always present in a situation before analytical reflection begins, 
and that the Dasein is found “in a finding which arises not so 
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much from a direct seeking”. But what can we say about the fact 
that the direct seeking has evolved from the expert systems of the 
1980s into the database analytics of the present day. And how we 
can quantify that ‘so much’ of the finding that arises from the 
direct seeking? In short, can we postulate that the Dasein is to 
some extent reflexively influenced by the technologies of direct 
seeking? According to Jannis Kallinikos the answer is ‘yes’. 
Formal analysis [or the database analytics of which Kallinikos 
spoke in his paper at Alpis 2009] appears limited only if it is 
distinguished from the non-rational, only if it is attributed a status 
of objectivity separate from the subjective status given to other 
epistemological positions. Kallinikos instead attributes to formal 
analysis the “tyranny of perpetual remembering” which 
overwhelms the evolutionary role and significance that forgetting 
has had in personal and cultural development. Moreover, a mass 
of data accumulated by the storage and processing power of 
computer memories is always addressed to the past. It thus 
favours the maintenance of what has happened rather than what 
might have happened: all the near misses, dreams and imaginings 
that are not captured in databases but which nevertheless 
influence our perceptions just as much as reality does. In this 
regard, Maniatopoulos [2009], drawing on the social theory of 
Castoriadis [1987], addresses the relationships among the rational, 
perceptual and imaginary components of signification in the 
context of technology choice. Maniatopoulos proposes 
Castoriadis’s theory as a resource for the analysis of the complex 
nature of technology choice and its relationship with institutional 
desires, fantasies and imaginary practices. The acquisition of 
certain technologies by organizations can simultaneously furnish 
evidence of membership in certain social groups, indicate 
significant relationships, and incorporate the imaginary 
corresponding to the professionalism with which that 
organization wants to represent itself.  
In this brief exploration of social studies on technology 
markets viewed through a phenomenological lens we have sought 
to enumerate some critical aspects of the phenomenological 
research tools employed to understand contemporary practices of 
information systems development. Firstly, by referring to a 
comparison between two techniques (that of planning model and 
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that of database analytics) we have asked the following question: 
what is the impact exerted by technological change on the 
epistemological categories used by Heideggerian phenomenology 
to describe formal analysis and cybernetics? We have answered 
this question by describing certain aspects of technology design, 
not as individual practice but as embedded in an evolving global 
market. Then, with reference to Pollock’s paper, we have read the 
practices of industrial analysts by proposing Heidegger’s concept 
of concealment as intentional and relational rather than as 
individual/ontological. We have subsequently described software 
development and its markets as ‘big science’, arguing, with 
reference to Kaniadakis’s notion of the “agora of the techno-
organizational change”, that a change of scale in a practice must 
necessarily be followed by the devising of new analytical 
categories for its understanding. Thirdly, we have addressed a 
problem of method: how can practices distributed in space and 
time be studied without the research design reflexively influencing 
the results obtained? We have proposed multi-sited ethnography 
as a practice that interprets this movement of methodological 
criticism 
+. Finally, with reference to a comparison between the 
planning model of expert systems which Suchman discusses and 
the database analytics described by Ayres, we have suggested that 
formal analysis restricts the possibility of understanding reality by 
acting performatively on it, extending the dimension of perpetual 
memory to the detriment of identifying the role of imaginary 
signification in definition of the organizational identity that also 
takes shape through technology choice. 
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Phenomenology and the Social Study
of Information Systems: 
Conversations with Kenneth Liberman 
Kenneth Liberman
with
Giolo Fele, Vincenzo D’Andrea, Gian Marco Campagnolo,
Ylenia Curzi, Gianluigi Viscusi 
Phenomenology and the Social Study of Information Systems: 
Conversations with Kenneth Liberman 
Kenneth Liberman with Giolo Fele, Vincenzo D’Andrea,
Gian Marco Campagnolo, Ylenia Curzi, Gianluigi Viscusi
Liberman invites us to explore the depths of our ordinary social world, the primitive place of our 
experience. As an anthropologist who spent two years with some Australian Aboriginal tribes and 
three years in a Tibetan monastery, he encourages us to reflect on that world taken for granted 
that we call reality. Similarly, as philosopher, he sees the limits of reason and the difficulties we 
fall into when we overconceptualize our worldly relations, when we entrust entirely to what he 
calls “the formal analysis”, when we don’t recognize the very carnal, practical and experiential 
character of social life. Starting from this basis, the paper offers grounds for reflection on the field 
of information systems.
Kenneth Liberman is Professor of Sociology at the University of Oregon. An ethnomethodologist 
and social phenomenologist, he has researched the practices of reasoning of Tibetan scholar-monks 
Dialectical Practices in Tibetan Philosophical Culture, Rowman & Littlefield. His most recent book is 
Husserl’s Criticism of Reason, With Ethnomethodological Specifications, Lexington Books.
Giolo Fele is Professor in Sociology of Communication at the Faculty of Sociology, University of 
Trento. 
Vincenzo D’Andrea is Associate Professor at the University of Trento, where he teaches Information 
Systems at School of Sociology.  
Gian Marco Campagnolo is post-doc fellow at the Department of Sociology and Social Research of 
the University of Trento. 
Ylenia Curzi is post-doc fellow at the Department of Business Administration of the Faculty of 
Economics of the University of Modena and Reggio Emilia. 
Gianluigi Viscusi is currently holding a post-doc position at the Department of Informatics, 
Systems and Communication (DISCo) of the University of Milano-Bicocca.
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